Abstract
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed increasing deployments of wireless mesh networks (WMNs [1] ) around us [2] . Unfortunately, WMNs are susceptible to a variety of threats against its routing protocols [3] . The reason is because the initial designs of routing protocols usually did not consider the security issues of wireless networks.
In general, routing attacks mainly aim to compromise the network security in terms of the data availability, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity [4] . While attacks on the last three security services can be protected by cryptographic mechanisms, attacks such as the packet drop attack, rushing attack and wormhole attack aimed against availability are relative difficult to defend.
Among such attacks against availability, the packet drop attack merits particular attention because it is not straightforward to determine whether dropped packets are the result from this attack or an occasional link failure. In addition, the rushing and wormhole attacks are both attempting to launch this attack. Therefore, if the impact of this attack can be minimized, the other two attacks against the availability could also be mitigated to some degree.
Reputation mechanisms are commonly used to address the issue of this kind of attack and random failures [5] . The reputation value of a node is generally computed according to that node's behavior records. A node with high reputation value is favored by others for routing packets.
In this paper, a distributed EigenTrust [6] algorithm is improved and implemented into AODV [7] to protect a WMN against the attack causing packets loss. The improved algorithm can still converge even when there are no pre-specified trusted nodes that are vital for the convergence of the original EigenTrust.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the reputation mechanisms and describes EigenTrust. Then, Section 3 shows why EigenTrust needs to be improved. After that, details in our implementation AODV-ET are illustrated in Section 4. Section 5 describes the experimental environment and results. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Related work

Reputation mechanisms
Reputation is usually calculated according to various criteria and used to evaluate a node's performance in terms of the quality of service it provides. For example, the CONFIDANT [8] scheme, where the watchdog [9] is used to observe nodes' behavior in DSR [10] supported wireless networks, detects and isolates misbehaved nodes, and encourages well-behaved nodes forwarding by incentives. Another example is CORE [11] that prevents selfish behavior of nodes in DSR based on a reputation that is computed by combining subjective reputation, indirect reputation and functional reputation. The watchdog technique is also applied in CORE. However, the watchdogs are classified into different groups to evaluate a certain type of activity specified by the system designer.
Besides, AODV-REX [12] introduces the reputation metric into AODV to mitigate the effect of the packet drop attack. In this scheme, every node is responsible for calculating the reputation of a given neighbor using the difference between its watchdog's observation towards the neighbor and the neighbor's previous reputation.
One weakness of the above schemes is that the reputation is separately calculated in accordance with observation from one or few nodes instead of the opinion from the whole network so that one node's reputation could be different from the perspectives of different nodes. That is to say, a misbehaved node may enjoy a high reputation in the view of some nodes. To address this issue, EigenTrust is employed to identify each node by a unique reputation value that reflects its trust rating from the perspective of the network.
SOPE [13] applied EigenTrust in DSR to calculate the reputation of nodes in order to protect a network against attacks. This scheme assigns every node a new property called 'centrality'. The nodes with both high centrality and high reputation are more likely to become sources for the reputation iteration. In fact, the sources play the same role as the pre-trusted nodes in the original EigenTrust, which guarantee that every node has a certain probability to converge and an ability to resist against the interference from malicious nodes. In addition, SOPE defines a degree centrality to allocate higher weights to the highly central nodes (sources), which leads to fast reputation convergence. Actually, what degree the centrality increases is the value of ® in equation (2) . The introduce of pre-trusted nodes and the increase of ® enlarge the second principle eigenvalue (¸2) of a network [14] and the convergence rate of EigenTrust depends on the ratio ¸2=¸1 as its basis Power Iteration [15] . Thus, the convergence rate becomes fast. However, SOPE does not propose a method to ensure the algorithm convergent when no pre-trusted nodes are defined.
EigenTrust
The EigenTrust algorithm is classified into the centralized one and the distributed one. The latter was developed on the basis of the former. Moreover, there are two types of reputation: local reputation and global reputation. The local reputation is a kind of local evaluation that one makes towards its given neighbor on the basis of the history of transactions to the neighbor. The global reputation represents one's trust rating over a network.
Centralized EigenTrust
In the centralized EigenTrust, every node's global reputation value is a component of the global reputation vector of a given network, which is calculated as follows:
where g k is the global reputation vector in the k th iteration, containing each node's global reputation in a network. L is defined as a matrix
consisting of all nodes' normalized local evaluations. l i is a normalized local reputation vector of node i.
If k is large enough, for any non-zero l i , g (k ) will converge to the same vector, namely the right principal eigenvector of L . In other words, the global reputation of each node will converge to a unique value in the scope of the entire network.
Distributed EigenTrust
In the distributed EigenTrust every node calculates its own global reputation based on the evaluations of all nodes towards it and their own global reputations. But, in most WMNs, a node only has interaction with its neighbors rather than the other nodes that have no direct connection to it and whose values of local evaluations about the node are zeros. So, actually, each node's global reputation is mainly based on the opinions from its neighbors as shown in equation (2) . In addition, every neighbor's global reputation also considers its own neighbors opinions, so the calculation indirectly takes the remote neighbors' opinions into consideration.
where g
is the global reputation of node i in the (k + 1) th iteration and ¹ l m i denotes the normalized local evaluation of i from the perspective of neighbor m . Besides, ® is a pre-defined decimal value between 0 and 1, and p i = 1=P . P is the number of the pre-trusted nodes.
Modified distributed EigenTrust
One purpose of introducing the pre-trusted nodes into the distributed EigenTrust is to transform L and its second principle eigenvalue in order to make the algorithm convergent and increase the convergence rate [14] , but the selection method of such nodes is still an open research problem and improper selection also compromises the convergence [6] . Most importantly, in AODV there is no scheme to count the number of pre-trust nodes in a network.
Therefore, equation (2) is altered to equation (3) that does not consider the pre-trusted nodes. g
Without pre-trusted nodes, the irreducibility and aperiodicity of L , which are the convergence premise of EigenTrust [6] , cannot always be achieved. To overcome this limitation, the distributed EigenTrust is modified in terms of the initial value and termination condition.
Initial reputation value
According to the definition of the irreducible matrix, the matrix has at least one non-zero offdiagonal element in each row and column [16] . Hence, if there is no zero element in the subdiagonal and superdiagonal of L , the irreducibility of the matrix can be achieved. Therefore, for each node i, a given neighbor's initial local reputation is set to a positive floating number near zero, e.g. 0.01, in equation (4) . 
where pkt tot denotes the number of packets forwarded by all neighbors of i and pkts j means the number of packets forwarded by a given neighbor j .
Besides, one's initial global reputation is set as one in our improved distributed EigenTrust algorithm.
Termination condition
It is assumed that L is said to have period k, namely L k+ 1 = L where k is the least such positive integer. Hence, after k + 1 iterations, g (k + 1) = L ¢g (0) =g (1) . According to the simulation result [6] of the centralized EigenTrust, the residual error ± (k + 1) =°g (k + 1) ¡ g (k )° monotonically decreases over iterations. Similarly, for the distributed method, the residual error ± (k + 1) should monotonically decrease as well. In view of the periodicity of L , ± (k + 1) can be rewritten as
Due to the decrease of ± , °g (1) ¡ g (k )° will be much larger than ± (k ) . Therefore, we can use this significant change of ± as a subsidiary condition for deciding whether to continue the calculation or not. In other words, if ± (k + 1) > ± (k ) , the calculation process has to be stopped; otherwise, it keeps going on.
Thus, equation (3) can be regarded as convergent before the (k + 1) th iteration.
In short, if ± (k + 1) > ± (k ) or ± (k + 1) · ² where ² is a predefined tolerance, the calculation of g (k + 1)
will be terminated.
AODV-ET: A Secure AODV Based on EigenTrust
This paper proposes a new secure AODV routing protocol based on the distributed EigenTrust algorithm described above. The new protocol is named as AODV-ET. This section describes the details in AODV-ET and how it works in WMNs.
Modification to RREQ
Similar to AODV-REX [12] , the standard RREQ message in AODV is modified to propagate reputation information, as shown in Figure 1 where there are two fields in solid boxes different from the original RREQ. The first bit 'O' in the reserved field is a flag of reputation extensions. The rest 10 bits of the field stand for the number of attached extensions. Moreover, reputation extensions are added at the end of the standard RREQ. One extension includes four fields: rater's IP address, rater's global reputation, ratee's IP address, and the local evaluation towards the ratee from the perspective of the rater. If a rater has more than one neighbor (ratee), their corresponding reputation extensions will be appended one by one.
RREQ Propagation
When generating a RREQ, a node attaches the latest reputation information about itself and its neighbors (ratees) to the RREQ. Additionally, when forwarding a RREQ, the node updates the attached extensions and inserts the new extensions that have not been contained in the RREQ.
Obviously, with the propagation of such RREQ including extensions, each node's reputation information can be spread over a network. 
Reputation Calculation
For each node i, the process of calculating its global reputation is described in Figure2. When the node i receives a RREQ with reputation extensions, it will firstly check every extension. If it finds out the extension in which its neighbor's global reputation and the neighbor's local evaluation about it are stored, the product of the two reputation values g j ¹ l j i will be accumulated. After each extension has been checked, if ± (k + 1) > ± (k ) or ± (k + 1) · ², the calculation will be terminated.
Route Reply
While a RREP is travelling back to a RREQ source, each of the intermediate nodes computes the Reputation Metric [12] to its downstream neighbor as follows:
R M i j = b(1 ¡ g j ) £ 30 + 0:5c + 1
Each of them adds the metric to Hop Count of the RREP to indicate a virtual distance to the destination that created the RREP. This distance takes the reputation of every intermediate node into account. When the RREQ source receives the RREP, it is able to recognize the trustworthiness of the route to the intended destination by the value of Hop Count in the RREP.
Obviously, it is possible that a source node replaces the route that includes misbehaved nodes with low reputations with another route having relative high reputation.
Figure 2. Global Reputation Calculation
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Experiments and results
The new proposed AODV-ET was implemented in Linux and tested in an office environment to verify if AODV-ET is able to switch from a route compromised by a packet drop attack to a relatively reliable route for data transmission. To the best of the author's knowledge, EigenTrust has never been implemented into AODV.
Testbed Setup
The testbed for AODV-ET consists of four computers: one laptop (Lenovo G430) and three desktops (Dell GX520). The chipsets of used wireless cards to form the WMN shown in Figure 3 are BCM4312 and RT73, respectively.
Based on AODV-FUUREX [17] , AODV-ET was implemented as a user space daemon in Linux Kernel and installed on Ubuntu 8.04 machines. One necessary component for running AODV-ET is the libpcap package that provides a portable framework for the watchdog to monitor the network traffic.
Experiment Results
Assume that host A in Figure 3 is the source node, and host D is the destination. The rest nodes are responsible for forwarding routing and data packets. The experiment procedure is described as following:
At the beginning, after each host connected with its neighbors, A started to send data packets to D. Without any outside interference, the source randomly selected C to forward data to D, even though B had the same initial global reputation value as C. As a result, the global reputation of C jumped to 1, because so far C forwarded all of data packets from A; By contrast, the global reputation of B was almost 0 as shown in Figure 4 . It can be seen that even though at first A selects C to forward data, but due to C is forced to drop packets from A for a long time, B's global reputation begins to increase and finally replaces C to forward data to D.
Of course, if the misbehavior of B causes its own global reputation falling underneath that of C in the future, the route forwarding through C will be re-selected again. In short, in AODV-ET the source node selects the relatively trustworthy path to forward data packets based on the reputation of the path.
Correspondingly, the virtual distance from A to D changed over time, as shown in Figure 5 , in this experiment. Figure 4 through C to D was selected by A and the hops of path1 was 2 because of no reputation penalty for C at that time. But, misbehavior of C resulted in the reduction of its global reputation and the growth of the one of B. Consequently, hops of path2 decreased from 32 to 31, and that of path1 increased from 2 to 26 (reputation penalty is 24). Notice that, the path to the destination still traversed through C, even though behavior of C had been abnormal. When the reputation of B was higher than the one of C, path2 was chosen by A because its hops had fallen from 31 to 18, less than the hops of path1 selected before. With the increase of the reputation of B, hops of path2 were further reduced.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the modified distributed EigenTrust algorithm was implemented into AODV to counter the effect of a packet drop attack against the data availability in WMNs. The experimental results show that the reputation calculation is convergent and AODV-ET is able to avoid the node having been compromised by that attack and select a relative reliable route to a destination without considering pre-trusted nodes.
However, the modified distributed EigenTrust might not converge faster than the original one because of the absence of the pre-trusted nodes.
In addition, AODV-ET does not consider the adverse situation where a malicious node can tamper reputation information or routing messages, because the situation falls into the scope of attacks on the data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity rather than the data availability.
In future work, encryption mechanisms, such as public-key and digital signature, would be utilized to strengthen AODV-ET.
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